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THE IMPACT OF TAIWAN’S 2008 ELECTIONS
ON CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS:
A GAME-THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang
As an “index case” of Third-Wave democracies facing
existential threat, Taiwan’s elections entail important implica-
tions for study in comparative politics and international rela-
tions. In 2008, three important elections help define the course
of Taiwan’s democratic development and its relationship with
China: the January legislative election, the March presidential
election, and a controversial referendum on Taiwan’s United
Nations entry. This article employs game theory to analyze
the impact of Taiwan’s 2008 elections on cross-strait relations.
It develops an “election game” by examining each principal
player’s preferences regarding each election. It analyzes Bei-
jing’s possible reaction to the potential outcomes, and then
examines the actual election outcomes against the model and
offers observations on the prospect of cross-strait relations.
Overall, the model predicts that cross-strait relations after the
2008 elections will present a historic opportunity, which can
be seized or squandered, depending on political leadership.
Key words: China-Taiwan relations, Democracy - East Asia,
East Asian politics
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Introduction: The Internal-External Nexus
The year 2008 marks a turning point in Taiwan’s democratic
political development and cross-strait relations. A key reason for
this prospect is the momentous elections that took place in Tai-
wan this year. On January 12, a parliamentary election was con-
ducted under a new, mixed electoral system that selected candi-
dates from single-member districts (SMDs) through the first-
past-the-post (FPTP) method and from lists nominated by politi-
cal parties. Taking the so-called Duverger’s Law (i.e., that a cor-
relation exists between the plurality method and a two-party sys-
tem)1 at its face value and hoping to emulate other states that
have adopted a mixed electoral system (e.g., Japan),2 many ana-
lysts hoped this new electoral system would contribute to a more
healthy electoral competition between the two major centrist par-
ties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP). They also hoped this new system would reduce the
influence of fringe candidates and money politics that became
somewhat common under the old system of single non-transfer-
able vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts (MMDs).
On March 22, 2008, the presidential election, featuring the
KMT’s and the DPP’s former chairmen, decided whether Taiwan’s
voters wanted a leader who will solidify the “Taiwan identity”
or one who promises to improve the economy and ease cross-
strait relations. That the identity issue became a key issue in
these elections,3 as it had been in recent years, was an important
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1. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the
Modern State, trans. Barbara North and Robert North (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1954).
2. For a comparison of Japan’s and Taiwan’s electoral reforms and their
lineage, see Jih-wen Lin, “The Politics of Reform in Japan and Taiwan,”
Journal of Democracy, vol. 17, No. 2 (April, 2006), pp. 118-31. For an edit-
ed volume based on articles from Journal of Democracy that provides
theoretical and comparative perspectives, see Larry Diamond and Marc
F. Plattner, eds., Electoral System and Democracy (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2006). For a general discussion of electoral
systems based on formal theory, see Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count:
Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1997).
3. In the eyes of many, that is how the DPP sought to set the agenda.
reason why Taiwan’s elections entail implications for its external
relations, particularly vis-à-vis China and the United States, and
for regional stability.4
The electoral link between Taiwan’s domestic politics and
its external relations was further accentuated by the two referen-
da regarding the issue of Taiwan’s entry into the United Nations
that were conducted on the same day as the presidential elec-
tion. The DPP-sponsored referendum called for the country’s
entry into the UN under the name “Taiwan.” Not to be outdone
by the DPP, the KMT sponsored a referendum calling for the
country’s return to the UN under flexible means.
Various major powers opposed the DPP’s UN referendum,
most significantly the United States, Taiwan’s chief security
backer.5 Chinese officials expressed their concerns that cross-
strait relations during the lead-up to the March 2008 presidential
elections might enter a “high danger period.” Passage of DPP’s
UN referendum would constitute a step toward a declaration of
de jure independence of Taiwan.6 For China, such a declaration
would be considered a “major incident” as defined in its Anti-
Secession Law (ASL), and would call for a response using “non-
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4. Jonathan Adams and Colum Murphy, “Dangerous Delusions over Tai-
wan,” Far Eastern Economic Review (October, 2007), pp. 14-19.
5. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in her December 21, 2007
press conference: “We think that Taiwan’s referendum to apply to the
United Nations under the name ‘Taiwan’ is a provocative policy. It
unnecessarily raises tensions in the Taiwan Strait and it promises no
real benefits for the people of Taiwan on the international stage.” Rice
was the highest U.S. official who rebuked the referendum; online at
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/12/97945.htm.
6. China’s official attitude was summarized in a State Council Taiwan
Affairs Office (TAO) statement on July 25, 2007, which branded both
Taiwan’s application for UN membership and the DPP’s UN referendum
as “attempts to alter the status quo that both the mainland and Taiwan
belong to one China and important steps toward Taiwan independence.”
Online at big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/tai_
gang_ao/200707/25/content_6426220.htm. There are similarities and
differences between the Chinese and U.S. reactions. U.S. Deputy Secretary
of State John Negroponte, interviewed by Phoenix TV on August 27, 2007,
characterized Taiwan’s UN referendum as “a step towards the declara-
tion—towards a declaration of independence of Taiwan, towards an alter-
ation of the status quo”; online at www.state.gov/s/d/2007/91479.htm.
peaceful means.”7 The United States, while stating that it did not
oppose Taiwan’s holding referenda, tried hard but to no avail to
dissuade the DPP government from conducting the most contro-
versial UN referendum, and, failing that, to appeal directly to
Taiwan voters.8
The internal-external linkage thus worked both ways. On
one side, through elections including referenda, Taiwan sought
to consolidate its democracy, solidify its place in the global com-
munity of democracies, and redefine its relationship with the
international society, including China, based on these new iden-
tities. On another, key external players, particularly the United
States and China, took an active interest in the outcome of these
elections and directly or indirectly involved themselves in Tai-
wan’s internal politics. Democracy and nationalism form a two-
faced Janus. While most elections in new democracies are
important for their own sake, few have as many international
implications as have Taiwan’s.
This article analyzes the impact of Taiwan’s 2008 elections
by employing concepts and insights from game theory to differ-
entiate and evaluate the various possible scenarios. My goal is
not to accurately predict the actual outcomes, but to work through
a heuristic model based on a “decision-making game.” The
model consists of three games (parliamentary, presidential elec-
tions, and referenda) and the preference order of three players
(the KMT, the DPP, and China). I intend this model to be logically
coherent and empirically plausible.9 After the model is presented,
actual vote outcomes are brought in for validation. Informed by
the model, a discussion on the elections’ impact on cross-strait
relations follows.
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7. For the Chinese full text of the Anti-Secession Law (Fan fenlieguojia fa,
March 14, 2005), see tw.people.com.cn/GB/14810/3240911.html. The
English full text is available online at english.people.com.cn/200503/
14/eng20050314_176746.html.
8. “U.S. Envoy Says UN Referendum Could Bind the Hands of New Tai-
wan President,” Associated Press, December 11, 2007.
9. For a useful primer on how game theory can help analyze politics, see
Peter C. Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1986).
Elections of 2008: An Overview
Before I formally present the model, a few words about the
three elections are in order. These necessarily brief remarks seek
only to provide a background for the game-theoretical analysis
in the next section. An in-depth discussion of the elections is
beyond the scope of this study.
The Legislative Election
The 2008 legislative election was conducted for the first time
under a new electoral system of single-member districts/two
ballots system (danyi xuanqu liangpiao zhi). “Each district pro-
duces only one winner (winner takes all); each voter can cast two
ballots—one for a district candidate and the other for a political
party.”10 The size of the Legislative Yuan (LY), Taiwan’s legisla-
ture, was halved from 225 to 113, and the term of legislators was
changed from three to four years. The 113 seats were divided as
follows: 73 were selected from SMDs, and 40 (34 for nationwide
and overseas delegates, 3 for plain aborigines, and 3 for moun-
tain aborigines) were selected in proportion to the vote shares
received by political parties competing in the second ballot, sub-
ject to a threshold of five percent.11
This new system replaced the multi-member districts/single
non-transferable vote (fushu xuanqu danpiao zhi) electoral system
that Taiwan had used for its legislative elections for decades. Under
the old system, a voter cast only one ballot for a candidate in a
much larger constituency that produced more than one winner
(e.g., Taipei County sent twenty-nine representatives to the Legisla-
tive Yuan). Of the 225 legislators elected in 2004, 158, about 70 per-
cent, were chosen from MMDs. The remaining seats—51 nation-
wide constituencies, 8 overseas constituencies, 4 plain aborigines,
and 4 mountain aborigines—were allocated in proportion to the
vote shares received by the parties competing in the MMD races.12
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10. For a primer of the new electoral system, see www.cna.com.tw/2008
LegislatorElection/2008_lei_w_4.aspx.
11. Ibid.
12. Data from Central Election Commission; available at 210.69.23.140/pdf/
B2004006.pdf.
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Table 1. Legislative Electoral Systems: Old vs. New
New system (2008) Old system (as of 2004)
Single-member districts/ Multi-member districts/
Name
two ballots single non-transferable vote
(danyi xuanqu liangpiao zhi, (fushu xuanqu danpiao zhi,
單一選區兩票制) 複數選區單票制)
It’s an electoral system 
Combines proportional Produces multiple 
that _____
representation (PR) and representatives in larger 
small electoral districts electoral districts
Each voter can cast Two: one for an SMD candidate; One: can only vote for one of 
_____ vote(s) the other for a political party the candidates in the MMD
113:79 SMDs (including 3 plain 225:166 MMDs (including 4 
Total number of seats aborigines and 3 mountain plain aborigines and 4 
in LY aborigines); 34 PR (nationwide mountain aborigines); 59 PR 
and overseas delegates) (51 nationwide, 8 overseas)
Each district produces 
Each district produces only 
predetermined number of seats. 
How district one seat. The winner must 
Each voter casts his/her only 
legislators are chosen? receive the most votes in 
vote for one candidate. Those 
that district.
candidates receiving the most 
votes up to that predetermined 
number are winners.
The votes received by an MMD 
The number of seats allocated candidate are deemed as 
How at-large 
to each party is proportionate support for his/her party. 
legislators are chosen?
to the party’s vote share in the Add up all the votes for his/
second (party) ballot-subject her party’s MMD candidates 
to a threshold (5%). to get a proportionate 
number of at-large seats.
SMD candidates will find it 
harder to get elected by It’s easier to aggregate votes 
Advantages relying on extreme positions for candidates who enjoy 
or a single issue. They must name recognition.
adopt a centrist stance.
Prone to two-party competition. 
Ample room for strategic 
Benefits large parties. Small 
allocation of votes. To ensure 
Disadvantages
parties find it harder to 
the largest number of victories, 
continue functioning.
political parties may 
strategically allocate votes.
Source: Compiled from United Daily News online, December 20, 2007; available at mag.udn.
com/mag/vote2007-08/storypage.jsp?f_ART_ID=102694.
Table 1 summarizes the differences between the old and the
new electoral systems.
As can be seen from Table 1, the main professed advantage
of the new electoral system was to shape Taiwan’s electoral poli-
tics into a healthier two-party system. The two major parties, the
KMT and the DPP, were expected to be the main beneficiaries of
this system, although the KMT was expected to be the larger
beneficiary.13 The smaller parties pinned their hope on the sec-
ond ballot: Ten parties other than the KMT and the DPP fielded
their candidate lists for the PR vote.14 Whether this new system
will result in “the best of both worlds”—combining the efficien-
cy of the plurality system and the representativeness of the PR
system—remains to be seen. It may take several elections for the
benefits of a major electoral reform to fully show, as Japan’s case
indicates.
One key consideration for Taiwan’s future is whether the
legislative election, in conjunction with the presidential election,
would perpetuate the divided government and its resultant
paralysis that Taiwan has experienced in the past eight years.
The DPP controlled the executive branch and the Pan-Blue coali-
tion under the KMT (see note 13) held the majority in the legisla-
ture. Alternatively, these elections could usher in a period of
unified and presumably more efficient government in which the
same party controls both the executive and the legislative
branches. Due to the negativity of the campaign and the voters’
relative unfamiliarity with the new voting system, voter turnout
was expected to be lower than the historical average of about 70
percent. Yet voter turnout was a key factor. The DDP, more than
the KMT, hoped to gain more from a higher voter turnout with
the help of referenda (to be discussed later).
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13. The KMT’s advantage stems from several factors: first, each sparsely
populated county on the offshore islands and Taiwan’s east coast receives
at least one seat, and these areas are traditionally pro-KMT; second, the
KMT’s minor partners in the Pan-Blue Coalition—the People First Party
and the New Party—now have greater incentive to run as KMT candi-
dates so as to benefit from the KMT’s resources; and third, the KMT has
a more extensive grassroots organizational base thanks to its decades-
old advantage under the old MMD system.
14. For the names of these minor parties, see www.cec.gov.tw/files//2007
1227093041_20071227.doc.
Presidential Election
The March presidential election featured two alternative tickets:
the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou with Vincent Siew and the DPP’s Frank
Hsieh with Su Chen-chang. In contrast to the legislative election,
the DPP believed that its chances would be better in a head-to-
head competition such as a presidential race. For most of the
2004 presidential campaign, the KMT’s Lien Chan and James
Soong ticket enjoyed a comfortable lead over their DPP rivals.
Yet they lost to Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu by 0.2 percent at
the end. A few analysts opined that the two referenda called for
by Chen helped boost the turnout by voters, especially Green
supporters. Despite the failure of the referenda due to lack of the
requisite quorum, half of all eligible voters picked up the refer-
enda ballots.15
Referenda
Believing in the referendum’s alleged effect of boosting voter
turnout and rationalizing it as a measure of direct democracy,
the DPP and its supporters once again planned for referenda in
conjunction with elections. This time Taiwan’s voters were asked
to cast their ballots during the same time as both the January leg-
islative election and the March presidential election. As previous-
ly stated, the DPP pushed for a referendum on whether the nation
should apply for UN membership under the name “Taiwan.” In
fact, the Taiwanese government in its annual bid for UN and
World Health Organization (WHO) membership earlier in 2007
had begun using the name “Taiwan.” Nonetheless, President
Chen claimed that the referendum was necessary because it would
signify the Taiwan people’s aspirations, which the international
152 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang
15. The two referenda asked voters whether they agreed that the nation
should establish a missile defense system in light of China’s growing
missile threats and whether they agreed that the nation should develop
a framework of peaceful interaction with China. Due to the Pan-Blue’s
boycott, about 45 percent of all eligible voters cast the referenda ballot,
but among those who voted in the referenda, over 92 percent agreed
with both referenda. Cf. David W. F. Huang, “Did the 2004 ‘Peace Ref-
erendum’ Contribute to the Consolidation of Taiwan’s Democracy?”
Taiwan Journal of Democracy, vol. 2, No. 2 (December, 2006), pp. 143-76.
community would thus be less likely to ignore. Seeking to offset
the DPP’s electoral benefits from exploiting the UN referendum
as an “identity card,” the KMT promoted its own referendum on
whether Taiwan should return to the UN under flexible means.
Two referenda were held in conjunction with the January 12
legislative election. Referendum number 3, sponsored by DPP
supporters, called for enacting a law to go after the “illegally
obtained” assets held by political parties—presumably the KMT.
Referendum number 4, sponsored by KMT supporters, called
for enacting a law to punish national leaders and their subordi-
nates whose “policy mistakes and corruption” caused big losses
for the nation.16 Neither passed, as only about 26 percent of all
voters cast their referendum ballots.17
For the purpose of this article, I focus my discussions on the
two UN-related referenda rather than the other two concerning
domestic politics for two reasons: first, the two UN referenda
entailed explicit external implications, which I want to examine;
and second, the KMT asked its supporters to boycott the January
referenda (including its own version), and boycott the March
referenda, contributing to the failure of each.
A fundamental determinant of the fate of any referendum in
Taiwan is that it must pass two majorities. Article 30 of the Ref-
erendum Law mandates that a referendum passes if (1) over half
of all eligible voters vote in a referendum and (2) over half of the
validly cast ballots concur.18 The first majority is a very high
hurdle: Taiwan’s electorate amounts to about 16.5 million, so
8.25 million voters must participate in any successful referendum.
Assuming the historical average voter turnout of 80 percent in
presidential elections, around 13.2 million voters were expected to
vote in the March presidential election. Assuming a hard-fought
battle, both the KMT and the DPP candidates would receive about
half of the votes, or approximately 6.6 million.19 If each major
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16. The text of these referenda can be found at www.cec.gov.tw/files//
20071030100224_SCAN6277_000.pdf and www.cec.gov.tw/files//
20071030100334_SCAN6276_000.pdf.
17. See Central Election Commission figures; available at www.cec.gov.tw.
18. Gongmin toupiao fa, as amended May 30, 2006. Text can be found at Tai-
wan’s Department of Justice data query, http://law.moj.gov.tw.
19. For an analysis along these lines, see the interview of the chief commis-
sioner of the Executive Yuan Referendum Review Commission by 
party’s partisan supporters did as their parties asked them to
do—voting for the referendum sponsored by their own party
but boycotting the other referendum sponsored by the rival
party—then neither referendum would receive 8.25 million votes
cast. Since the object of the two referenda—Taiwan’s membership
in the UN—enjoys high popular support, an unknown number
of voters might vote yes on both referenda. If there were enough
such voters and if the voter turnout for the presidential election
was particularly strong, then one or both referenda might pass.
The probability that either or both UN referenda would
pass in March 2008 was thought to be higher. One reason is that
the Central Election Commission made it easier for voters to cast
votes for the presidential candidates and the referenda through
the so-called “one-step voting method,” whereas in 2004 the
presidential election and the referenda were conducted sepa-
rately (one had to ask for a particular ballot, hence revealing
one’s preference—a violation of the constitutional principle of
the secret ballot). The second reason is that since it was politically
awkward for the KMT once again to boycott its own UN refer-
endum, as it did in January, the party tacitly blessed its supporters
who wanted to vote for the KMT version or both the KMT and
DPP versions.
Therefore, regarding referenda, the most important consider-
ation was whether either or both of the UN referenda would pass.
Considering the international reactions, the assumption was that
the passage of either one, but especially the DPP version, would
likely raise tension in cross-strait relations because the DPP might
have argued that the results from the passed referendum were
binding on Chen’s successors. Also, the referenda signified the
general populace’s acceptance of using the name “Taiwan” rather
than the country’s official name, the Republic of China (ROC), for
membership in intergovernmental organizations.
With the above background information, we can examine
the impact of Taiwan’s 2008 elections on cross-strait relations
through elementary formal analysis.
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Russian media. “Kao Yung-kuang: Neither the Entering UN Referendum
Nor the Returning to the UN Referendum Will Pass,” Central News
Agency, December 14, 2007.
The Election Game
The Game Tree
Figure 1 is an extensive or game-tree form of Taiwan’s 2008
“election game.” An arrow indicates the start of the game. It
points to a node (■) which stands for the choice facing actor one.
In this game, the first decision (“actor 1”) is the January legisla-
tive election because it was the first of the three races and the
outcome of the legislative election could have an impact on the
March presidential election and referenda. For the sake of parsi-
mony, let’s assume “actor one” can have only two “choices” (or
the legislative election can have only two outcomes)—either the
Pan-Blue (consisting of the KMT, the People First Party, and the
New Party) wins the majority of seats in the LY, or the Pan-
Green (consisting of the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union)
wins a majority of the seats.
The second decision (“actor 2”)—the March presidential elec-
tion—has two “choices” (outcomes): a victory by either the KMT
ticket (Ma-Siew) or the DPP ticket (Hsieh-Su).
The third decision (“actor 3”) is a little more complicated,
because two referenda—the KMT-sponsored and the DPP-spon-
sored, respectively—were to be conducted simultaneously. Logi-
cally it can have four “choices” (outcomes): both referenda pass;
the DPP-sponsored referendum passes but not the KMT-spon-
sored referendum (indicated as “DPP Ref pass”); the KMT-spon-
sored referendum passes but not the DPP-sponsored referendum
(indicated as “KMT Ref pass”); and neither referendum passes.
Altogether there are sixteen possible outcomes (2 x 2 x 4), each
ending with a solid dot (●), indicating the end of the game.20
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20. Strictly speaking, because the presidential election and the referenda
will be held simultaneously (i.e., “actor 3” makes decisions without
knowing how “actor 2” has voted), there should be an “information
set”—indicated by a dotted envelope—over the third decision (UN refer-
enda). For simplicity and because one can argue that the presidential
election and the referenda are held sequentially (implying that the
above condition for information set does not hold), I have eliminated
that. See Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory, chapter 3.
Players’ Preference Orders and Payoffs
I next identify the three principal players in this election game:
the KMT, the DPP, and China (represented by the Chinese Com-
munist Party, or CCP). Including the CCP in this game is justi-
fied since this article seeks to analyze the impact of the electoral
competition mainly between the KMT and the DPP on cross-
strait relations. Prospects of cross-strait relations are shaped
importantly by China’s anticipated reaction to the outcomes of
Taiwan’s elections. China’s anticipated reaction can be deduced,
to some extent, from a discussion of its preference orders in this
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Figure 1. The 2008 Taiwan Elections Game
game. For the purpose of my analysis, each of these three play-
ers is regarded as a unitary rational actor.
My subsequent analysis is based on a few assumptions.
Reasonable people may quibble with these assumptions, but I
argue that these assumptions are plausible and that even if one
alters certain assumptions, the logic of analysis remains the
same, albeit the outcomes differ.
For the January legislative election, I assume that the KMT
prefers a Pan-Blue majority to a Pan-Green majority in the LY
(with the DPP preferring the opposite). This statement seems
self-evident and requires little justification, since political parties
are assumed axiomatically to want to be in power. I assume that
the CCP, despite its “official neutrality,” prefers a Pan-Blue majori-
ty to a Pan-Green majority mainly because the standoff between
the Pan-Blue and the Pan-Green from 2000-2008 assures China
that having a Blue-controlled LY is a counterbalance to a DPP
president. To formalize:
• KMT: Blue majority > Green majority
• DPP: Green majority > Blue majority
• CCP: Blue majority > Green majority
For the presidential election, I assume the KMT prefers a KMT
victory over a DPP victory, and the DPP prefers a DPP victory
over a KMT victory. The CCP prefers a KMT victory over a DPP
victory because the KMT candidate is more likely to accept a “one
China” precondition for resuming cross-strait dialogue. However,
it should be pointed out that Ma Ying-jeou maintained that the
KMT’s “one China” means “one China, each side has its own
interpretation” (yige Zhongguo gezi biaoshu) which, as far as the
KMT was concerned, meant the ROC. By contrast, DPP’s Chen
had maintained he would be willing to discuss the meaning of
“one China” with Chinese leaders but not accept it as a precondi-
tion. Therefore,
• KMT: KMT victory > DPP victory
• DPP: DPP victory > KMT victory
• CCP: KMT victory > DPP victory
Regarding referenda, the DPP’s preferred outcome was that
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its UN referendum passed because this would imply a high voter
turnout for the presidential election, thus increasing the chance
of a DPP victory. It would also be a step toward declaring the
independence of Taiwan. Its second preferred outcome was that
both its and the KMT’s referenda passed. Passage would mean
that neither the KMT nor the DPP would benefit from the refer-
endum. Its third preferred outcome was that neither referendum
passed, because even though (as in the both-passing scenario)
the electoral benefits to both parties would be cancelled out, the
DPP attached greater importance to a referendum than did the
KMT. Not passing its referendum would thus mean a larger net
loss for the DPP than for the KMT. The DPP’s least-favored out-
come was for the KMT’s UN referendum to pass, but not the
DPP’s. This would mean that the DPP failed to gain from the
referendum and the KMT benefited from the referendum. It
would also likely mean that the DPP would lose the presidential
election.
• DPP: DPP Ref > both pass > neither pass > KMT Ref
For the KMT, since it emulated the DPP’s UN referendum
out of defensive consideration and had twice boycotted the ref-
erendum (in 2004 and 2008), we can assume that it preferred
that there be no referendum, or that no referendum passed. Its
next favorite outcome was that its own referendum passed, fol-
lowed by both referenda passing. The most objectionable out-
come was that the DPP referendum passed.
• KMT: Neither pass > KMT Ref > both pass > DPP Ref
The CCP’s preference order is influenced by the CCP’s gen-
eral antipathy toward direct democracy (rather than democratic
centralism), but its experience with and reaction toward Tai-
wan’s first exercises of referenda in 2004 and 2008—under DPP
tutelage—were especially negative. Like the KMT, the CCP pre-
ferred that there be no referendum, albeit with greater vehe-
mence, because it had elevated the referendum into the polemics
of war and peace. The passage of DDP’s referendum would be
the most adverse outcome. Between the two intermediate out-
comes, the CCP may have preferred “KMT ref” to “both pass.”
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Although “both pass” may mean that the KMT’s and the DPP’s
referenda mutually cancelled out, it also meant that the DPP’s
referendum passed, which indicated popular acceptance of the
DPP’s definition of Taiwan’s identity. If only the KMT’s referen-
dum passed, and the KMT won the presidency, the CCP would
expect that the future KMT administration would implement the
KMT referendum with much discretion.
• CCP: Neither pass > KMT Ref > both pass > DPP Ref
Finally, to differentiate the rank orders of identical prefer-
ences, we need to distinguish the relative importance of each of
these three elections to the three players. In other words, which
election will affect a particular player’s interests the most? This
point will become clear later when I discuss each of the sixteen
outcomes and why a particular outcome receives a higher pay-
off than the other.
For the KMT, the most important election was the presidential
election, and the least important, or the one it least cared about,
was the referendum, with the legislative election in between. Its
unfamiliar role as the opposition party for the past eight years
taught the KMT the fundamental importance of winning the
presidential race. Winning the legislative election would ensure
“the status quo” if the DPP’s Hsieh won the presidency. That is,
the KMT could continue to block a DPP government. The referen-
dum was the least important because the KMT’s entire approach
toward referendum had been conditioned by its opposition to its
perception of DPP manipulation of the referendum.
• KMT: presidential > legislative > referendum
For the DPP, the most important election also was the presi-
dential race, because a continuation of a DPP presidency was
indispensable to the party’s short-term goal of maintaining its
power and to its longer-term goals of amending the constitution
or promulgating a new constitution and establishing an indepen-
dent Republic of Taiwan. The legislative election came in second
because, in the event of a KMT presidency, the DPP hoped to
counterbalance the KMT with a DPP-controlled LY majority.
Ironically, the referendum was the most dispensable interest.
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The 2004 experience is illustrative: The referenda, though failed,
did help catapult Chen to a second term. In 2008, the referen-
dum remained the means for more important goals, such as
winning the presidency and agenda-setting.
• DPP: presidential > legislative > referendum
For the CCP, the referendum was the most important because,
as stated above, it viewed the UN referenda in war-and-peace
terms. The presidential election came next, because without the
pressure of a referendum, the CCP may have found it easier to
deal with the new ROC president and could afford to appear
conciliatory. While the CCP may have had a private preference
for the KMT’s Ma over the DPP’s Hsieh, owing to the former’s
acceptance of “one China,” it could reasonably expect that even
Hsieh would be more acceptable than Chen. The legislative elec-
tion was the least important, mainly because the CCP had little
leverage there given the multitude of contests.
• CCP: referendum > presidential > legislative
We can now summarize all the foregoing discussions of
players’ preference orders into Table 2.
Under each row label I add a bracket [  ] with three numbers
to notate the relative importance of this particular election to
each of the three players. For instance, the notation under the
legislative election, [K2, D2, C3] means that the legislative elec-
tion was the second most important race for the KMT, the sec-
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Table 2. Preference Order of Principal Players: A Stylized Comparison
KMT DPP CCP
LY Election Blue (majority) > Green > Blue Blue > Green
[K2, D2, C3] Green (majority)
Presidential KMT (victory) > DPP > KMT KMT > DPP
[K1, D1, C2] DPP (victory)
Referenda Neither pass > KMT Ref > DPP Ref > both pass > Neither pass > KMT Ref >
[K3, D3, C1] both pass > DPP Ref neither pass > KMT Ref both pass > DPP Ref 
ond most important for the DPP, and the least important for the
CCP.
Based on the foregoing discussions, I now follow the princi-
ples as spelled out in Table 2 and derive a payoff bracket for each
of the sixteen outcomes (see the right-hand side of Figure 1).
Each of the payoff brackets contains three numbers: the first
payoff number is for the KMT, the second for the DPP, and the
third for the CCP. In the case of each player, a payoff of “1” indi-
cates the best outcome, “2” the second best, up through “16” the
worst, for this player.
An example will help. What should be the KMT’s best pay-
off represented as the combination of election results that it most
preferred? We know the KMT preferred a KMT presidential vic-
tory, a Blue LY majority, and no referendum—in that order, so
the best payoff “1” was the fourth top-most outcome (1, 15, 1).
The KMT least preferred a DPP presidential victory, a Green LY
majority, and passage of the DPP referendum. So the worst pay-
off “16” should go to the third bottom-most outcome (16, 1, 16).
Within each pathway (e.g., KMT presidential victory and Blue
LY majority), the payoffs are ranked in accordance with the
KMT’s preference order regarding referendum. So the top four
form a set, before going to the third set, which results from a
KMT presidential victory but a Green LY majority.
Due to space limitation, this example illustrates the princi-
ples and rules for assigning payoffs. Readers are encouraged to
follow that example and Table 2 to validate the payoffs for all
three players under all sixteen scenarios.
Patterns and Prospects
From the above analysis and visualizing Figure 1, we can
summarize several patterns. First, not a single outcome is equally
acceptable to all parties. In other words, there is no overall best
outcome in absolute terms. Second, this model shows that there
exists greater congruence in interests between the KMT and the CCP
than between the DPP and the CCP. Certainly, I am not question-
ing the KMT’s allegiance here, nor am I arguing that this con-
gruence alone will be a sufficient condition for cross-strait recon-
ciliation after May 2008. But it does offer an opportunity, as will
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be discussed later.
Third, overall, both the KMT and the DPP’s preferences were
highest under a unified government led by itself (reading verti-
cally the bottom four outcomes where DPP’s second best, best,
fourth best, and third best playoffs are located) and were lowest
under a unified government led by the other (14, 13, 16, 15).
Between the two scenarios of divided government, both the KMT
and the DPP preferred to control the presidency to controlling
the legislature.
Fourth, the CCP’s preferences were exceptionally varied
under conditions of either unified government (Blue legislature
and KMT presidency, or Green legislature and DPP presidency) or
divided government. This shows that the CCP attached greater
importance to the outcome of the referendum than to either the
presidential or the legislative election.
Fifth, we can turn this model into a predictive model by
assigning probabilities to each of the decision nodes along the
way [e.g., assigning p for Blue LY majority, and thus 1-p for
Green LY majority; q for KMT presidency and thus 1-q for DPP
for DPP presidency, so the probability for a unified government
under the Green is (1-p)*(1-q)]. We can thus contextualize the
impact of the elections. For instance, certain scenarios may have
been very “grim” as far as Beijing was concerned (e.g. 16, 1, 16
which happens when the DPP triumphs in all three elections);
they may be very low-probability scenarios. Questions thus
arise as to whether it is wise to focus too much policy attention
on high-impact-but-low-probability scenarios. In other words,
this may lead to excessively risk-averse policy decisions, which
may not be optimal.21
Sixth, however, this model serves a “predictive” function in
a different sense—that is, once we know the actual outcomes of
each of the three elections, we know how much each player will
like or dislike that actual outcome.22
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21. But I have refrained from assigning probabilities because such probability
assignment may be tinted with subjectivism and may require justification
that is beyond the scope of this article.
22. For instance, if the Pan-Blue had won the LY and the presidency and
neither referendum had passed (1, 15, 1), we can be reasonably confident
that Beijing would have been delighted with those results. (Indeed, this 
It should be noted that all these numbers 1, 2...16 are mea-
sured on an ordinal scale. A 1 simply means it is a better out-
come than 2, 2 is better than 3, and so on. But, I am agnostic
about how much better 1 is than 2 (or the distance between 1
and 2) out of concern for inter-coder reliability. Readers may
plug in real ratio numbers (e.g., 10, 20, and 20-10=30-20) as they
see fit. Nevertheless, the logic remains the same.
Seventh, this model has limits. It is constructed upon my
knowledge about the players’ existing policies, preferences, and
discourse, and based on several plausible (but nonetheless pos-
sibly wrong) assumptions I made. It is very path-dependent.
This simple model has not, for example, taken into account the
possibility of change.23
This article has sought to illuminate the external impact of
Taiwan’s 2008 elections by borrowing some basic concepts and
insights from game theory. To do so, I have developed an “elec-
tion game” by examining each principal player’s preference
order regarding each election and the relative importance the
player attaches to each election. Figure 1 shows the payoff struc-
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is what actually happened.) Conversely, if the Pan-Green had won the
presidency, the Pan-Blue had won the LY, and neither referendum had
passed (9, 7, 3), we can also predict that Beijing would have taken solace
that the UN referendum had failed and a Pan-Blue LY would have con-
tinued to block a DPP president—basically a continuation of the status
quo.
23. For instance, the model predicts that China will be very angry with (16,
1, 16): The DPP wins all three elections, and pundits may predict that
China may then invoke ASL to use force against Taiwan. But it is also
possible that Beijing may learn to deal pragmatically with an outcome
not to its liking and will therefore behave differently from what this
model would predict. While passage of the DPP referendum seems to
cross Beijing’s proverbial “red line,” past experience—the 1996 democ-
ratic election of ROC president, the 2000 presidential victory by the pro-
independence DPP, the 2004 reelection of Chen—shows that Beijing has
been capable of learning not to paint itself into a rhetorical corner. While
Beijing has condemned passage of the UN referendum as a “major
step” toward Taiwan independence—a casus belli under ASL—much
depends on how each major player interprets that outcome. It could be
overplayed as an 1812-style “declaration of independence,” or it could
be downplayed as a more serious “opinion poll.” In sum, the future is
not preordained, and human agency still matters in history.
ture for all possible scenarios. It analyzes the impact of each pos-
sible electoral outcome on one aspect of cross-strait relations—
Beijing’s possible reaction as deduced from its known prefer-
ence structure.
According to this model, other things being equal, several
conclusions can be summed up.
1. Non-passage of the UN referendum seemed conducive to cross-
strait relations.
2. Despite its official “neutrality,” Beijing preferred a KMT president,
judging from the congruence between its and KMT’s payoffs.
3. Beijing’s preferences were indeterminate under conditions of
unified or divided government. The main driver seems to have
been non-passage of the UN referendum.
4. A DPP presidential victory was not as inimical to cross-strait rela-
tions as passage of the DPP’s UN referendum. This indicates that
Beijing was prepared to deal with a DPP president, even though it
preferred a KMT president.
5. In a paradoxical way, since the referenda—Beijing’s main con-
cerns—were more likely than not to fail (due to the high quorum
required, a KMT boycott, and U.S. opposition), cross-strait relations
should not have been worse, and may well have been better, than
during Chen’s second term. Nonetheless, several drivers, such as
the one-step voting method, political parties’ mobilization, and
possible backfire arising from U.S. criticisms, raised the probability
that this year’s referenda would pass.
The next section examines the actual election outcomes,
informed by the above analysis.
Election Outcomes
Table 3 summarizes the actual results from Taiwan’s legisla-
tive and presidential elections and referenda. It reveals several
important findings. First, the new electoral system for the legisla-
tive election prima facie achieved its intended outcomes. The elec-
tion solidified the KMT and the DPP as the only major political
parties in Taiwan for the foreseeable future. Smaller parties, such
as the PFP (a Pan-Blue partner) and the TSU (a Pan-Green part-
ner), were marginalized. They failed to garner any seats in the PR
ballot, indicating the five-percent threshold might have been too
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Table 3. Results of Taiwan’s 2008 Elections
A. Legislative Election
Non-
KMT DPP PFP partisan Independents Total
alliance
Districts & 
aborigines (SMD)
Vote share 53.50% 38.17% 0.29% 2.42% 3.98% 100%
Seats (1) 61 13 1 3 1 79
Seat share 77.21% 16.45% 1.26% 1.26% 100%
Party list 
nationwide (PR)
Vote share 51.23% 36.91% – 2.42% –
Seats (2) 20 14 0 0 0 34
Seat share 58.82% 41.17% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Total seats: 81 27 1 3 1 113
(1) + (2)
Total seat share 71.68% 23.89% 0.85% 2.65% 0.85% 100%
Voter turnout: 58.50%
B. Presidential Election
Nominating party KMT (Ma-Siew) DPP (Hsieh-Su)
Votes 7,659,014 5,444,949
Percentage 58.45% 41.55%
Total eligible voters: 17,321,622
Voter turnout: 76.33%
C. Referenda
No. 5 (DPP version) No. 6 (KMT version)
Number of votes cast 6,201,677 6,187,118
Percentage of total eligible voters 35.82% 35.74%
Number of valid votes 5,881,589 5,686,369
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
94.01% 5.99% 87.27% 12.73%
Result Does not pass Does not pass
Total eligible voters: 17,313,854
Source: Central Election Commission (www.cec.gov.tw).
high. But most importantly, this election portended a two-party
system in Taiwan. In fact, the KMT received a huge “winner’s
bonus” (a common outcome of plurality/majoritarian electoral
systems), beating the DPP by about 15 percent in terms of vote
share, but three-to-one in seat share. Aligning with the Non-Party
Alliance and independents blessed by the Pan-Blue, the Pan-Blue
now controls over three-quarters of all the seats in the LY—more
than the majority needed for constitutional amendments. The
KMT was the biggest winner, the DPP suffered a crushing defeat,
and all smaller parties were marginalized. Voter turnout was 58.5
percent, lower than in legislative elections of recent years.
Second, the March presidential election did not go the way
of a “pendulum swing,” as DPP loyalists had hoped. Instead, it
symbolized “the second shoe that dropped.” The KMT ticket, Ma-
Siew, beat the DPP ticket, Hsieh-Su, by 16 percentage points or
over two million votes. Voter turnout was 76.3 percent, the low-
est since 1996. While the results symbolized the voters’ stinging
verdict of the Chen administration’s eight-year rule, Ma’s wide
margin of victory surprised most analysts. For the first time
since 2000, Taiwan has a unified government: The KMT controls
both the executive and legislative branches. While some people
may have feared abuse of power, the elections clarified account-
ability and made responsible party politics theoretically more
possible. The voters gave the KMT a mandate. Taiwan fulfilled
political scientist Samuel Huntington’s “two-turnover” test for a
consolidated democracy.24 In terms of theories of democratiza-
tion, the 2008 elections represented major steps in Taiwan’s
democratic development.
Third, the controversial UN referenda did not pass due to
the same reason as the previous four: failure to reach the requi-
site quorum. Close to 36 percent of voters voted in the referenda
(less than the 50 percent required), with the DPP version receiv-
ing slightly more turnout, and more affirmative votes. The
DPP’s strategy of mobilizing partisan support and using the ref-
erendum to boost turnout for its presidential candidate clearly—
a strategy that was said to contribute to Chen’s narrow reelec-
tion victory in 2004—failed this time. Ever since Taiwan promul-
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24. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twen-
tieth Century (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
gated nationwide referenda in the 2004 election, no referendum
has passed. Partisan manipulation undoubtedly contributed to
this. But it is equally important to look into whether the quorum
is too high, considering the political cleavage in Taiwan politics.
In a nutshell, the overall outcomes of the three elections of
2008 can be summarized this way. The DPP’s loss is the KMT’s
gain. The failed referendum defused a potential volatile situa-
tion. And China and the United States also stood to benefit from
the results. Returning to Figure 1, the results are summarized in
the (1, 15, 1) outcome—the best overall outcome for the KMT and
the CCP, respectively, and the second-worst outcome for the
DPP.
Prospect: A Fresh Opportunity?
As analyzed earlier, the CCP should be quite pleased with
the election results, based on its known preference structure. In
that regard, the elections opened a fresh opportunity for improv-
ing cross-strait relations. But it is important to note that it is
merely an opportunity, one that can lead to important break-
throughs in this difficult relationship or slip away. Beijing more
than Taipei bears more responsibility in the next few months for
improving cross-strait relations for reasons that will be explained
below.
First, during campaigns, both Ma and Hsieh vowed to improve
cross-strait relations, signaling a departure from Chen’s shrill inde-
pendence move. Ma in particular stressed the importance of
“normalizing” cross-strait relations: further liberalization of cross-
strait trade and investment, incremental but accelerated progress
toward direct flights between the mainland and Taiwan, and
admission of more Chinese tourists. If Beijing can “cooperate” on
some of these issues, it will empower Ma and contribute to stabili-
ty in cross-strait relations. Conversely, if Beijing does not meet Ma
halfway, it will undermine Ma’s credibility among Taiwan’s mod-
erate voters and validate the DPP’s claim that Beijing cannot be
trusted. The first few months of the Ma presidency could be a
“honeymoon” period. The U.S. government is also likely to
respond more favorably to Chen’s successor.
Second, Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan under CCP General
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Secretary Hu Jintao has refocused its priority on preventing inde-
pendence rather than forcing unification, adopting more concilia-
tory rhetoric and pragmatic tactics but maintaining essentially
the same policies. For example, while upholding China’s policies
of “peaceful reunification under “one country, two systems,” Hu
Jintao, in his work report to the 17th National Congress of the
CCP, called on Taiwan to negotiate under the “one China” pre-
condition—ending the state of hostility across the strait, leading
to a “peace agreement.”25 Under the overarching strategy of
“peaceful development” and “harmonious society,” Beijing clam-
ors for a peaceful international environment, especially in the
lead-up to the summer 2008 Olympics Games in Beijing.
On his part, Ma campaigned on “three noes”: If he was
elected, he pledged that there would be no unification, no inde-
pendence, and no war in his term. There thus exists some over-
lap between CCP’s and KMT’s positions, and it is these common
“gray areas” that both sides are cautiously exploring for ele-
ments of a potential modus vivendi.
In 1992, representatives of the semi-official Strait Exchange
Foundation (SEF) and Association of Relations Across the Tai-
wan Straits (ARATS) reached a deadlock over the issue of “one
China,” which Beijing required as a prerequisite for cross-strait
dialogue. The two sides reached a compromise of some sort
(agree to disagree). Beijing’s understanding was that both sides
had respectively agreed, through verbal means, to “one China”
(ge biao yi Zhong), but did not go into the meaning of that “one
China.” Taipei’s understanding was “one China, but each has its
own interpretation” (yi Zhong ge biao), or yige Zhongguo, gezi
biaoshu). Allegedly on this basis, the heads of SEF and ARATS
met in Singapore in 1993 and established a framework for cross-
strait dialogue. The SEF-ARATS dialogue was suspended in 1995
after Beijing reacted angrily to former Taiwan president Lee
Teng-hui’s visit to his alma mater, Cornell University. In the late
1990s, Chi Su, a key KMT aide and the new National Security
Advisor to President Ma Ying-jeou, coined the phrase “92 Con-
sensus” (jiuer gongshi) as a shorthand for the political basis for
168 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang
25. Hu’s work report to the 17th CCP national congress can be found at
big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-
10/24/content_6939223.htm.
cross-strait dialogue during the Lee Teng-hui era.26
Upon assuming office, Chen Shui-bian maintained that he
could not find any reference to “92 Consensus” in the negotiation
records. He said that his government would agree to talk with
China about “one China” as a topic (yiti) but would not accept it
as a precondition (qianti). There was thus no semi-official dia-
logue such as SEF-ARATS during the Chen administration.27
Interestingly enough, Beijing now seems to be willing to use
the phrase “92 Consensus” as a supposed “one China precondi-
tion.” According to U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen
Hadley, Chinese President Hu Jintao reportedly mentioned that
he was willing to resume cross-strait dialogue based on the “92
Consensus.” This occurred in his telephone conversation with
President George W. Bush after Taiwan’s March presidential
election.”28
Third, there is no great impetus, pressing need, or moral
justification for Beijing to behave belligerently. The referenda
failed, for the reasons mentioned above. Moreover, even if one
or two referenda had passed, how Taiwanese and Chinese lead-
ers would have interpreted those results and how Taiwanese
leaders would have chosen to implement the results should be
observed first. Lastly, in a year when Beijing is dealing with a
series of internal and external challenges—the natural disasters
in January (snow storm) and May (earthquake), the uprising
and repression in Tibet, and the protests along the Olympic
torch route—it has an incentive to avoid troubles on the Taiwan
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26. Dr. Chi Su, personal communication, Taipei, March 23, 2008.
27. See Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “The Chen Shui-Bian Administration’s
Mainland Policy: Toward a Modus Vivendi or Continued Stalemate?”
American Asian Review, vol. 20, No. 3 (Fall, 2002), pp. 91-124.
28. In his March 26, 2008 press conference, Hadley said, “He [Chinese Presi-
dent Hu] said that it is China’s consistent stand that the Chinese main-
land and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of
the 1992 consensus, which sees both sides recognize there is only one
China, but agree to differ on its definitions. The interesting thing is
whether this is an indication or a signal of a willingness to open dialogue
on a basis that in previous years had been accepted by both parties.”
Available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080326-3.
html. Curiously, the phrase “92 Consensus” only appeared in the English,
but not the Chinese, readout of China’s official Xinhua news agency.
front. The outcomes of Taiwan’s elections substantially relieved
that concern. In April China invited Siew to the Boao Forum.
Though Siew attended as the head of a foundation promoting
cross-strait common market, the significance of the first vice
president-elect’s visit was not lost.
After Ma’s inauguration, in late May, the CCP invited KMT
Chairman Wu Po-hsiung to visit. Although it was then-KMT
Chairman Lien Chan who in 2005 pioneered the KMT-CCP dia-
logue, the KMT was in opposition then. Wu’s visit would sym-
bolize the first-ever visit to China by the head of Taiwan’s ruling
party. Symbolism notwithstanding, China appears eager to lock
in the KMT’s commitment to the “92 Consensus.” Whether Bei-
jing would seize that opportunity to reach some kind of modus
vivendi with Taiwan under Ma remains to be seen. The first test
is whether Beijing would cooperate by allowing weekend char-
ter flights with Taiwan and allowing mainland tourists to visit
Taiwan, thus enabling Ma to fulfill his first campaign promise.
The most difficult tests would be whether China would feel rea-
sonably assured so as to change its obstruction of Taiwan’s quest
for greater international space and reduce its military threats
vis-à-vis Taiwan.
However, tension cannot be ruled out. Beijing’s unease with
the temporary instability unleashed during Taiwan’s democratic
convulsion was illustrated by comments by Colonel Zhu Shaopeng
of China’s Academy of Military Science. Zhu warned that “If Tai-
wan independence elements continue challenging the ‘one China’
principle, there will surely be a war in the Taiwan Strait.” He pre-
dicted that China and Taiwan would fight a “small war” (xiao da):
To exert pressure on Taiwan and to prevent American intervention,
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may seize Taiwan-held off-
shore islands of Kinmen and Matsu, capturing the 40,000 Tai-
wanese troops there, because the Taiwan Relations Act does not
cover these islands.29 Zhu’s threats were unusual in that up until
now, Beijing has preferred preventive diplomacy to military
threats; it has also preferred to ask the United States to put pressure
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(PLA Colonel: If Taiwan Independence Elements Keep Provoking, There
Will Be a Small War in the Taiwan Strait), Lianhe zaobao (online), Decem-
ber 28, 2007; available at www.zaobao.com/zg/zg071228_506.shtml.
on Taiwan, rather than itself blustering and intimidating, which
backfired in the past.
Ultimately, the U.S. attitude is a crucial factor that influ-
ences the magnitude of the external impact of Taiwan’s elec-
tions. At a time when its forces are overstretched in the Middle
East and Southwest Asia and facing the challenge caused by a
nuclear North Korea, the United States regrettably at the present
time is simply not prepared to support Taiwan’s quest for
greater international recognition if it risks tension with China,
whose cooperation on various global and regional issues the
United States needs.
Finally, the referendum was the catalyst that connects Tai-
wan’s internal-external nexus. On the one hand, the DPP would
endeavor to make the referendum more routine on Taiwan’s
electoral calendar so as to lay the groundwork for any possible
future constitutional revision, which requires ratification by Tai-
wan’s voters, or a plebiscite that decides on Taiwan’s ultimate
relationship with China. But the DPP would justify this election-
eering in the discourse of democratic deepening or consolidation.
On the other hand, the KMT would continue to appear ambiva-
lent and defensive, and China and the United States would con-
tinue to appear anxious and concerned about Taiwan’s referenda
with implications for cross-strait relations. Their overreaction
may pose a threat to limiting the scope of Taiwan’s democratic
development. That most of the hitherto national referenda have
appeared to be ploys used by political parties to advance narrow
partisan interests cannot but increase the cynicism of quite a
number of Taiwanese voters and diminish the value of referen-
dum as a tool to promote direct democracy. Internationally, the
failure of Taiwan’s electorate to pass a referendum to advance
Taiwan’s UN bid as a result of Machiavellian gamesmanship
may help obscure the real object—the Taiwanese people’s quest
for greater voice and dignity in the international community—
and make it more difficult for various countries important to Tai-
wan’s security and livelihood to publicly display their sympathy.
But these reflections deserve a separate study.
Fortunately, before the momentous 2008 is over, we should
be able to take stock on how these various factors—Taiwan’s
elections (which resulted in a second rotation of power, an indi-
cator of democratic consolidation, and increasing use of referen-
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dum), China’s quest for glory and stability, and America’s pref-
erence for the status quo—will combine to influence cross-strait
relations. I, for one, am willing to be cautiously optimistic.
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